We study the price of anarchy of coordination mechanisms for a scheduling problem where each job j has a weight wj, processing time pij, assignment cost hij, and communication delay (or release date) rij on machine i. Each machine is free to declare its own scheduling policy. Each job is a selfish agent and selects a machine that minimizes its own disutility, which is equal to its weighted completion time plus its assignment cost. The goal is to minimize the total disutility incurred by all the jobs. Our model is general enough to capture scheduling jobs in a distributed environment with heterogeneous machines (or data centers) that are situated across different locations.
INTRODUCTION
Explosive growth of data has driven distributed computing to evolve at an unprecedented pace. In modern distributed systems, there are a large number of machines which are clustered and connected in a variety of topologies, and situated across different geographical locations. Hence routing jobs can incur considerable costs and communication delays. Machines are also inherently heterogeneous, having very different architectures and accesses to energy resources -some machines can process some jobs more efficiently and at cheaper costs. Due to the large scale of such systems, centralized algorithms for scheduling jobs is not very practical. Moreover, in many scenarios each job is a selfish agent that strategically selects a machine for getting processed. Can such a decentralized system perform well in spite of the strategic behaviors of the jobs? We explore this question under a mechanism design paradigm called coordination mechanisms [8] .
Model
There is a set J of n jobs, and a set M of m unrelated machines. A job j has a weight wj, and it needs pij units of processing time if scheduled on machine i -our analysis can be easily extended to unrelated weights wij. The job j has a communication delay (or release date) rij on machine i, i.e, the machine can start processing the job only after time rij. Further, the job j incurs an assignment cost hij if it is assigned to the machine i. This, for example, captures the energy costs.
In a sharp contrast with the centralized view of classical scheduling models, here each job is a self-interested and autonomous agent free to select its own machine. Every machine declares its scheduling policy in advance, and this induces a simultaneous-move game between the jobs. The strategy of a job consists of choosing the machine where it will get processed. Each job wants to minimize its own disutility, which is its weighted completion time plus its assignment cost. A Nash equilibrium of this game is a stable outcome where no job can reduce its disutility by switching to another machine. The strategic interactions among the jobs may lead to overall degradation in system performance. The standard benchmark to measure this deterioration is the Price of Anarchy (PoA), first introduced in [18] . This is the worst case (maximum possible) ratio of total disutility of the jobs in a Nash Equilibrium to that in an optimal solution (which assumes centralized assignment and no strategic behavior).
We let different machines declare different scheduling policies. Each of these policies, however, must be strongly local: each machine i only knows the wj, pij, rij, and hij values of the jobs j that were assigned to it, but is not aware of the characteristics (processing lengths, release dates etc.) of the jobs on other machines. In the absence of a global view of the input, a reasonable option for a machine is to declare a scheduling policy that (approximately) minimizes its own share of the objective, namely, the total weighted completion time of all the jobs assigned to it. This raises a compelling question:
• Do all scheduling policies that are O(1)-approximate on a single machine result in coordination mechanisms with O(1) price of anarchy? If the answer is no, is there a characterization of single-machine scheduling policies that induce O(1) price of anarchy?
Our Results
In this paper, we present a general recipe for designing coordination mechanisms for minimizing the total weighted completion time of the jobs plus their assignment costs. The machines need not agree upon a specific scheduling policy. Nevertheless, the system will have small constant price of anarchy as long as every machine selects a scheduling policy that satisfies a certain bounded stretch condition introduced in this paper (see Sections 1.2.1,1.2.2). We further show that almost all scheduling policies used in practice satisfy this condition. We complement this positive result by showing that there exists a widely used O(1)-approximate singlemachine scheduling policy that does not satisfy the bounded stretch condition, and induces a game with large price of anarchy. Finally, we extend our results to all norms of completion times of the jobs (see Section 1.2.3), and present a general black box reduction to non-preemptive scheduling policies (see Section 1.2.4).
All the previous works on coordination mechanisms for completion time scheduling [10, 9] focused on the case without communication delays (release dates) and assignment costs, i.e., rij = hij = 0. We note that release dates introduce a significant complexity in scheduling, and algorithms for problems without release dates typically do not generalize to those with release dates. For example, the underlying optimization problem on a single machine is polynomial time solvable via a greedy algorithm without release dates, but is NP-Hard with release dates [23] . Furthermore, the previous works [10, 9] analyze very specific scheduling policies, and restrict all machines to announce the same scheduling policy. In contrast, we give a new dimension to the problem by allowing different machines to declare different scheduling policies. This generalization models the real world applications more accurately, since the machines (or data centers) are typically owned and operated by different entities.
Our results rely upon two novel techniques. (a) A potential function that leads to an instantaneous smoothness condition; and (b) Linear programming and dual fitting.
Characterization of Good Single-machine Scheduling Policies
We introduce the notion of a scheduling policy with bounded stretch in the definition given below. We note that our notion of stretch is different from the standard definition of stretch used in scheduling literature. Definition 1. Suppose that a machine is processing a given set of jobs. The scheduling policy followed by the machine has a stretch α iff the completion time Cj of each job j (with weight wj, release date rj, and processing time pj) satisfies the inequality:
To understand the above definition, assume for a while that all the jobs have unit weight, and note that the total delay encountered by a job j is equal to Cj −(rj +pj). What should be a reasonable upper bound on the contribution (say η j ) of some specific job j = j towards this delay Cj − (rj + pj)? Without any loss of generality, we can assume that the job j completes after the release date of the job j, i.e. C j ≥ rj; otherwise η j is zero. The α-stretch condition says that η j can be at most α times min(pj, p j ). Note that the job j can delay the job j when it gets processed with a higher priority, and this can happen for an amount of time equal to the job j 's size, which is p j . Further, the α-stretch condition requires that the policy is fair to both the jobs and hence the bound α · min(pj, p j ). Finally, the weights of the jobs are also factored in.
Our notion of 'bounded stretch' is closely related to the concepts of 'slowdown' and 'liability' considered in the work [19] . In [19] , the slowdown of a job is defined as its 'flowtime' (Cj − rj) divided by its processing length pj. Furthermore, the liability of a job is the worst possible slowdown it can experience. The goal is to design 'fair' scheduling policies where the liability of every job j is bounded by the size of the machine's queue, and in particular, is independent of the processing lengths of other jobs. For example, if all the jobs have unit weights and are released at time t = 0, then in any scheduling policy with stretch α the liability of every job is at most (1 + αn), where n is the number of jobs assigned to the machine.
This seemingly simple characterization turns out to be quite powerful. In Appendix A, we describe many scheduling policies that are used in practice, and most of these policies have bounded stretch. The reader may find it helpful to compare Definition 1 with the definition of the Weighted Round Robin (WRR) scheduling policy (see Appendix A). An important distinction between the two definitions is that the stretch condition does not specify a scheduling policy but is only concerned with the final completion times of the jobs. On the other hand, the scheduling policies with bounded stretch behave similar to WRR, in the sense that each job delays another job by at most α times it own processing length. This provides an intuitive explanation as to why such policies should lead to equilibria with small PoA.
Price of Anarchy Bounds for Coordination Mechanisms
With the above definition of bounded stretch, we prove the following general result.
Theorem 2. Suppose that each machine declares a (possibly different) scheduling policy with stretch α. Then the resulting game has a robust (smooth) price of anarchy of at most
Particularly when α = 1, the bound is at most 5.8284, and this holds for many popular scheduling policies.
The interesting aspect of the above result is the analysis. We present two analysis techniques which yield somewhat different bounds -potential functions and dual fitting. Conceptually, our techniques are inspired by the elegant work on online scheduling [7, 1, 15] -the connection being that in both cases, we need to compare the decisions made by the optimal solution (that is non-strategic and omniscient) with the solution that arises due to the execution of the implemented policy. However, the similarity ends thereunlike online algorithms, in a coordination game, a job is selfish and cannot be forced to go to a specific machine and hence equilibrium state cannot be controlled by an algorithm. Moreover, a game can have multiple equilibria, and the analysis should hold for all them simultaneously.
Potential Functions. Our first technique uses a smoothness argument (see Section 2) via a carefully constructed potential function (see Section 3). The difficulty in a direct smoothness argument is that we have to compare the execution of two policies that make decisions over time, and these decisions could be very divergent. Note that unlike the case without release dates [10] , we cannot write closed form expressions for the completion time induced by specific policies. Instead, we show that the derivative of the potential function (w.r.t. time) gives an instantaneous smoothness inequality that is easy to compute. We then integrate this inequality over time to derive the final smoothness bound. To our knowledge, this type of approach inspired by online algorithms has not been used before in the context of price of anarchy.
Dual Fitting. (See Section 4.) Consider the optimization problem underlying our game-theoretic framework, where the goal is to minimize the total weighted completion time of the jobs plus their assignment costs. We write a timeindexed LP-relaxation of the problem, similar to the one in [1] . Using the dual of this LP, we bound the price of anarchy of the game induced between the jobs, when every machine declares a scheduling policy satisfying certain natural conditions (see Section 4). The idea is to take any Nash equilibrium of the game, and appropriately charge the disutility of each job to the dual variables in a way such that (a) all the dual constraints are satisfied, and (b) the dual objective is at least η times the total disutility incurred by all the jobs in the Nash equilibrium, for some η ∈ (0, 1]. This shows that the price of anarchy is at most 1/η due to weak duality.
In contrast to a potential function based argument, one apparent drawback of the dual-fitting framework is that for technical reasons we need to impose two restrictions on the allowable class of scheduling policies in addition to the bounded stretch condition. These restrictions, however, are fairly intuitive. We are not aware of any simple, combinatorial scheduling policy with bounded stretch that violates the additional assumptions required in the dual-fitting proof. Further, unlike the potential function analysis, the dual-fitting proof only bounds the price of anarchy of pure, mixed Nash and correlated equilibria, and at present we do not see any way to extend the proof to get a robust (smooth) price of anarchy bound which, in addition to these three solution concepts, also applies to no regret sequences [20] .
Nevertheless, we feel the dual-fitting framework is interesting in its own right, as it establishes a connection between the price of anarchy of a coordination mechanism and the LP relaxation of the underlying optimization problem. Further, it yields the following improved theorem: This matches the lower bound [10] known for non-preemptive scheduling policies when there are no release dates and assignment costs -note that Highest Density First is a nonpreemptive policy in the absence of release dates. The dualfitting approach also helps us compare against an optimal migratory solution where a job is processed over multiple machines. To our knowledge, this type of approach to bound the price of anarchy of games has not been considered previously in the literature.
Scheduling Policies with Large Stretch. As our α-stretch condition is fairly general and most of the popular scheduling policies have bounded stretch, the reader may be tempted to conjecture that all scheduling policies that are O(1)-approximation on a single machine lead to coordination mechanisms with O(1) price of anarchy. However, we show in Appendix B that this is not the case. The scheduling policy Weighted Latest Arrival Processor Sharing (WLAPS) gives O(1)-approximation to the total weighted completion time on a single machine. But it does not induce a game with constant price of anarchy. The scheduling policy WLAPS generalizes Round Robin to favor more recent jobs, and has been extensively studied in scheduling theory -particularly in broadcast scheduling problems [12, 3] . Not surprisingly, WLAPS fails our bounded stretch condition (α is Ω(n)). Thus, our characterization seems to separate scheduling policies which are good in non-strategic settings from those which lead to small Price of Anarchy.
Extension to k -norms
Next, we extend our result to the more general objective of minimizing k -norms of completion time where 1 ≤ k < ∞. Note that the total completion time is the 1-norm and the maximum completion time (makespan) is the ∞-norm. The 1-norm objective may starve some jobs for an unacceptably long time while focusing too much on average performance. In contrast, the ∞-norm tries to be as fair as possible at the expense of average performance. The k -norms, k ≥ 2 make a natural balance between average performance and fairness [4, 14, 1] . We prove the following theorem in Section 6.
Theorem 4. Suppose that each machine declares a (possibly different) scheduling policy with stretch α. Then the resulting game has a robust price of anarchy of O(kα k+1 ) for minimizing the k -norm of completion time of jobs, for any k ≥ 1.
We present our result only for the unweighted jobs case, and will extend our result to the k -norm of weighted completion time in the full version of the paper. We note that previous work [9] considered only Shortest Job First (SJF) and Round Robin (RR) policies without release dates, and showed that they have robust price of anarchy of O(k) and O(2 k ), respectively. (In [9] , the authors present the analysis for unweighted k -norms of completion time, and claim that their analysis extends to weighted k norms. We remind the reader that SJF is the unweighted version of HDF). Theorem 4 implies an exponential improvement for Round Robin (which has stretch α = 1), and this holds even with release dates. As observed in [9] , due to a well-known relationship between k -norms and the ∞-norm we have the following theorem as a corollary.
Theorem 5. Suppose that each machine declares a (possibly different) strongly local scheduling policy with stretch α = 1. Then the resulting game has a robust price of anarchy of O(log n) w.r.t. the objective of minimizing the makespan, where n is the number of jobs.
The above theorem complments the lower bound of Ω(m) known for the price of anarchy of strongly local scheduling policies [2] , where m is the number of machines (see Section 1.3).
Non-preemptive Scheduling Policies
In some applications, preempting a job can be costly, and non-preemptive scheduling policies are highly desirable. When the jobs arrive online, however, no natural non-preemptive scheduling policy gives O(1) approximation to the weighted completion time, even on a single machine. This is particularly relevant since both our potential function and dualfitting proofs are inspired by the frameworks developed for online scheduling problems [7, 1] . Nevertheless, in Section 5 we present a general black box reduction from preemptive scheduling policies to non-preemptive scheduling policies that preserve the stretch within a factor of two. This reduction is an adaptation of the idea used in [13] .
Theorem 6. There exists a reduction that takes any preemptive scheduling policy with stretch α and outputs a nonpreemptive scheduling policy with stretch at most 2α.
The above theorem, along with Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, shows how to construct non-preemptive (offline) scheduling policies that lead to small constant price of anarchy.
Pure Nash Equilibrium
Although a correlated equilibrium (which can be computed in polynomial time) and a mixed Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist in every finite game, not all games have pure Nash equilibrium (PNE). For example, when there are no communication delays (release dates) and assignment costs, it is known that the game induced by the Highest Density First policy might not have a PNE [10] . In contrast, a PNE is guaranteed to exist in the game induced by the Weighted Round Robin (WRR) policy (see Appendix A for definitions). It is not clear if this property of WRR continues to hold in the presence of release dates and assignment costs. We address this concern by transforming the WRR policy. The idea is to run the WRR schedule but delay the completion time of a job, forcing it to satisfy the following condition.
One way to achieve this is to process the last portion of job j at time t = (1/wj) · j min(wjp j , w j pj). It is easy to verify that the stretch of the resulting schedule is at most 2. The proof for WRR in [10] can be easily extended to show that this induces a potential game. Hence, a PNE is guaranteed to exist, and the Nash dynamics converges toward a PNE in pseudo-polynomial time.
Related Work
There has been a lot of work on approximation algorithms for minimizing the weighted sum of completion times [13, 21, 22] . Our potential function and dual-fitting techniques are inspired by the elegant framework developed for online scheduling in [7, 1] . We note that their framework can be adapted to yield combinatorial scheduling policies for weighted completion time that are also O(1)-approximations. Here, each machine simply schedules the set of jobs assigned to it using, for example, the Highest Residual Density First policy (see Appendix A for definition). The algorithm considers the jobs in increasing order of their release dates and applies a greedy dispatch rule, assigning a job j to that machine i which increases the overall objective function (for the currently dispatched jobs) by the least amount. Although our potential function and dual-fitting proofs are inspired by this framework, as mentioned above, the settings are actually very different. For instance, there is a scheduling policy (see Section B) that gives O(1)-approximation to the online optimization problem when used in conjunction with the greedy dispatch rule, but induces a game with very large price of anarchy.
Coordination mechanisms were first introduced in [8] . See the survey [16] for various selfish scheduling models. The study of coordination mechanisms for the completion time objective was initiated in [10, 11] . In the absence of release dates and assignment costs, they show constant factor price of anarchy bounds for for three specific policies -Weighted Round Robin (WRR), Highest Density First (HDF), and Random (RAND). In particular, their bounds are tight for the first two policies.
They also show that, both WRR and RAND induce pure Nash Equilibrium while HDF does not. The l k -norms of the completion time were considered [9] . They prove a price of anarchy of O(k) for Shortest Job First (when there are no weights, release dates, and assignment costs), and show that no strongly local deterministic policy can achieve a price of anarchy better than O(k/ log log k).
Azar et al [2] design coordination mechanisms for the makespan objective. They show a lower bound of Ω(m) for any strongly local scheduling policy (see Section 1.1 for definition), where m is the number of machines. In contrast, they present a weakly local scheduling policy (where a machine knows everything about the jobs assigned to it, including their processing lengths on other machines) that achieves a price of anarchy of O(log m), and a policy that induces a pure Nash Equilibrium with PoA of O(log 2 m). These results were later extended by Caragiannis [6] . Similar to our work, he showed a strong connection between coordination mechanisms and online algorithms [5] . It will be interesting to study whether this is purely coincidental, or if there is a deeper connection between price of anarchy and competitive ratios.
PRELIMINARIES
Recall the concepts and notations introduced in Section 1.1. We index a machine by i ∈ M, and a job by j ∈ J . Each machine i ∈ M declares a strongly local scheduling policy Ai. Let the symbol A = (A1, . . . Ai, . . . A |M| ) denote the profile of scheduling policies. Let Game(A) denote the resulting game induced between the jobs. An outcome of this game is a strategy-profile θ = (θ1, . . . θj, . . . θ |J | ), where θj ∈ M is the machine selected by the job j ∈ J . For notational convenience, we also define an assignment-vector Q that summarizes the outcome from the perspective of the machines. The vector Q = (Q1, . . . Qi, . . . Q |M| ) has |M| components, and the i th component of this vector refers to the set of jobs assigned to machine i ∈ M. Thus, we have Qi = {j ∈ J : θj = i}. The completion time of a job j under this outcome is given by C A j (θ). The disutility of the job equals its assignment cost plus its weighted completion time, and this is denoted by COST
The outcome is a pure Nash equilibrium iff no job can reduce its disutility by switching to another machine, i.e., COST
where θ−j is the strategy-profile of all the jobs except the job j.
We reserve the term scenario for a triple S = (A, Q, θ). This specifies the scheduling policy followed by every machine, and an outcome of the resulting game. The symbol pij(t) denotes the remaining processing length of a job j ∈ Qi on machine i at time t. We say that the job is unfinished at time t iff pij(t) > 0. The symbol Wi(t) denotes the total weight of the unfinished jobs on machine i at time t.
Fix any profile of scheduling policies A, and let Ne(A) be the set of all pure Nash equilibria of Game(A). The objective is to minimize the total disutility of the jobs. The price of anarchy of this game is:
Note that the above expression compares the worst Nash equilibrium of Game(A) with the optimal solution to the underlying optimization problem, which may use an entirely different profile of scheduling policies. The notion of price of anarchy as defined above is not applicable in games that do not admit any pure Nash equilibrium. To address this issue, Roughgarden [20] introduced a smoothness framework which gives robust price of anarchy bounds for generalized solution concepts such as mixed Nash and correlated equilibria and no regret sequences. Adapting the smoothness framework to our context, we say that the Game(A) is (λ, µ)-smooth iff the following inequality holds for any two scenarios S = (A, Q, θ) and S = (A , Q , θ ).
(1) The reader may find it helpful to think of the scenario S as a pure Nash equilibrium of Game(A), and the scenario S as an optimal solution to the underlying optimization problem. It can be shown that the price of anarchy of any (λ, µ)-smooth game is at most λ/(1 − µ) for mixed Nash, correlated equilibria and no regret sequences [20] . Hence, it is also as termed robust PoA.
ROBUST PRICE OF ANARCHY BOUND VIA POTENTIAL FUNCTION
We devote this entire section to proving Theorem 2 by a potential function based argument. Throughout this section, we fix two scenarios S = (A, Q, θ) and S = (A ,
Note that the left hand side of Equation 1 results from mixing two completely different scenarios S and S . Hence, it is not easy to relate this quantity with the right hand side, which consists of the weighted completion times under the two individual scenarios. This is the case particularly when the jobs are released over time, as it becomes extremely difficult to derive mathematical expressions for the terms in Equation 1 .
To circumvent this difficulty, we upper bound the left hand side by a carefully chosen potential function, and consider its derivative with respect to time. The advantage of this approach is that we have a good understanding of how an algorithm makes instantaneous scheduling decision. For example, the instantaneous increase in the total weighted completion time is simply the total weight of the unfinished jobs. In other words, each unfinished job j incurs a penalty of wj at each time step.
For a technical reason that will become clear as we proceed with the proof, we slow down the schedule under S by a (suitably chosen) constant factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Let A (δ) denote the new profile of scheduling policies, and let S (δ) = (A (δ), Q , θ ) denote the new resulting scenario. More precisely, a job is processed on machine i at time t in S iff it is processed on the same machine i at time t/δ in S (δ). Note that the assignment vector and the strategy-profile remain the same across the two scenarios S and S (δ).
We emphasize that S (δ) is not the schedule that results from the machines executing the policies A with speed δ. Rather, S (δ) is obtained by stretching out the schedule S by a factor of 1/δ over the time horizon. It is easy to see that this transformation increases the completion time of a job by a factor of 1/δ. Overview of our approach. Recall the notations introduced in Section 2. We will always index the jobs by j under the scenario S, and by j under the scenario S (δ). The remaining processing lengths will be denoted by pij(t) under the scenario S, and by p * ij (t) under the scenario S (δ). Similarly, the total weight of the unfinished jobs on a machine will be denoted by Wi(t) under the scenario S, and by W * i (t) under the scenario S (δ). With these notations in place, we are now ready to define our potential function.
Let COST S = j COST A j (θ) denote the total disutility of all the jobs under the scenario S = (A, Q, θ), which is the same as their total weighted completion time (assuming zero assignment costs). Hence, we can write this quantity as
, where the derivative d dt COST S (t) equals the total weight of the unfinished jobs at time t under the scenario S. Similarly, let COST S (resp. COST S (δ) ) denote the total disutility of all the jobs under the scenario S (resp. S (δ)). Fact 1 implies that COST S (δ) = (1/δ) · COST S . We will show that Φ(t) is a good estimate of the left hand side of Equation 1 . In particular, we will prove that Φ(t) satisfies the following conditions.
at every time t
In Equation 4, the symbol α denotes the stretch of the scheduling policies declared by the machines (see Definition 1) under the scenario S. 
The last equality follows from Fact 1.
Thus, setting λ = (1 + α/δ) and µ = αδ, we get a robust price of anarchy bound of (1 + α/δ)/(1 − αδ). This leads to Theorem 2. More specifically, by setting δ = 1/(2α), we obtain a robust PoA bound of 2(1 + 2α
2 ). The best bound
we can obtain here is
This bound becomes ( √ 2+1)/( √ 2−1) 5.8284 when α = 1.
Remark. When all the release dates are zero, the robust price of anarchy bound improves to 4α 2 . This improvement follows from a better bound for Equation 4 , namely, we can show that its left hand side is at most α · Φ(0). Note that this bound is tight [10] when α = 1 (see Theorem 1).
Full analysis. Let Φi(t) denote the contribution towards Φ(t) by machine i ∈ M, and let Φ ij (t) denote the contribution towards Φi(t) by job j ∈ Q i . Thus, we have:
The next two lemmas show that Φ(t) satisfies the boundary conditions at t = 0 and t = ∞.
Lemma 1. The potential function Φ(t) satisfies Equation 3.
Proof. Follows from the observation that each job has zero remaining processing length at time t = ∞.
Lemma 2. The potential function Φ(t) satisfies Equation 4.
Proof. Fix any machine i ∈ M. For every job j ∈ Q i , As justified below, we have:
The first inequality holds since the scheduling policy Ai has stretch α (see Definition 1). The last inequality holds since the completion time of job j under any feasible schedule is at least r ij + p ij . Finally, note that w j · C A j (i, θ −j ) = COST A j (i, θ −j ) in the absence of assignment costs. So the lemma follows when we sum both sides of Equation 9 over all machines i ∈ M and jobs j ∈ Q i .
It remains to show that Φ(t) satisfies Equation 5
. We will first make some simple observations. Fact 2. The functions pij(t), p * ij (t), and Φ ij (t) are all continuous and non-increasing in t.
The following facts hold since the machines operate at speed δ (resp. 1) under scenario S (δ) (resp. S).
Fact 3. Fix any machine i ∈ M, and any two jobs j ∈ Q i and j ∈ Qi. At any time t, we have:
Fact 4. At any time t, on any machine i ∈ M, we have:
We now bound the rate of change in Φi(t) due to any unfinished job under the scenario S (δ). Claim 1. For every job j ∈ Q i that completes after time t under the scenario S (δ), we have:
Proof. Recall that Φ ij (t) is a summation over a set of terms, each corresponding to a job j ∈ Qi assigned to the same machine i, but under a different scenario S (see Equation 6). Each such term is the minimum of two functions: w j · pij(t) and wj · p * ij (t). We partition all the jobs in Qi into two subsets Y and Z, depending on which of the two functions attain the minimum value: Y = {j ∈ Qi : w j · pij(t) ≤ wj · p * ij (t)}, and
The functions f Y (t), f Z (t) capture the respective contributions of the subsets Y and Z towards Φ ij (t).
Further, since the job j completes after time t under the scenario S (δ), we have p * ij (t) > 0. It follows that every job j ∈ Z has pij(t) > 0. In other words, every job in Z completes after time t under the scenario S, which implies that j∈Z wj ≤ Wi(t). Hence, we conclude: The next claim shows that we can ignore the jobs that finishes before time t under the scenario S (δ).
Claim 2. For every job j ∈ Q i that completes before time t under the scenario S (δ), we have:
Proof. Follows from the observation that such a job j has p * ij (t ) = 0 for all t ≥ t.
The next claim bounds the overall rate of change of Φi(t).
Claim 3. For any machine i ∈ M and any time t, we have:
Proof. We infer that:
Equation 12 follows from Claim 1 and Claim 2. Equation 13 follows from Fact 4. Now we are ready to bound the overall rate of change of Φ(t).
Lemma 3. The potential function Φ(t) satisfies Equation 5.
Proof. Follows from summing both sides of the inequality in Claim 3 over all machines i ∈ M, and recalling that
PRICE OF ANARCHY USING DUAL FIT-TING
In this section, we improve the bound on the PoA of α-stretch scheduling policies to 4α using dual fitting. For simplicity of exposition, we only derive the PoA of pure Nash equilibria, and defer the extension to mixed Nash and correlated equilibria to Section 4.1. We require that the scheduling policies satisfy two properties in addition to the bounded stretch condition.
Definition 2 (Myopic Policy).
A scheduling policy is myopic iff its scheduling decision depends only on the status of the jobs available for processing at the present time instant. In particular, the decision is independent of the jobs that will be released in future.
Assume for a while that all the jobs have unit weights, and consider a machine which follows the SRPT scheduling policy. At time t, this machine looks at the set of jobs available in its queue, and works on the job j with shortest remaining processing time pj(t). At time t + 1, it repeats the same process. This policy is myopic, since its scheduling decision depends only on the jobs currently available in the machine's queue. The reader may find it helpful to keep this example in mind while going through the rest of this section.
Definition 3 (Monotone Policy).
A scheduling policy is monotone iff it satisfies three properties. (1) Everything else remaining the same, the completion time of a job can never increase if it is released at an earlier date. (2) Everything else remaining the same, the completion time of a job j can never decrease if the machine is asked to process an extra job j . (3) For any two jobs j and j with wj = w j , rj ≤ r j , and pj ≤ p j , the completion time of job j is at most the completion time of job j , i.e, Cj ≤ C j .
All scheduling policies that give O(1)-approximations on a single machine (see Appendix A), with the exception of WLAPS, are myopic and monotone, and have stretch α = 1. We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 8. Suppose that each machine declares a (possibly different) scheduling policy which is myopic, monotone and has stretch α ≥ 1. Then the price of anarchy of the induced game is at most 4α.
First we derive a bound on the completion time of a job. The next lemma justifies our use of the term "bounded stretch", for traditionally the "stretch" of a job is defined as its completion time minus its release date divided by its processing length.
Lemma 4. If a machine runs a scheduling policy with stretch α ≥ 1, then a job j (with weight wj, release date rj, processing length pj, and completion time Cj) on the machine satisfies the following condition.
Here, the symbol W (t) denotes the total weight of the unfinished jobs at time t.
Proof. Since the scheduling policy has stretch α ≥ 1, Definition 1 implies that:
Consider the LP Primal described below [1] . It has a variable xijt for each machine i ∈ M, each job j ∈ J and each unit time-slot t ≥ rij. If the machine i processes the job j during the whole time-slot t, then this variable is set to 1. The first constraint says that every job has to be completely processed. The second constraint says that a machine cannot process more than one unit of the jobs during any time-slot. Note that the LP allows a job to be processed simultaneously across different machines.
In the objective function, the term i t≥r ij hij·(xijt/pij) gives the assignment cost incurred by the job j. The term i t≥r ij wj ·xijt·(t/pij) is known as the fractional weighted completion time of the job j. In a feasible schedule this quantity is no more than its integral weighted completion time, minus half of its weighted processing time. Finally, the remaining term i t≥r ij wj · xijt · (1/2) equals half of the weighted processing time of the job. Thus, adding up these three terms, we see that the disutility of a job j is at least i t≥r ij hij · (xijt/pij) + i t≥r ij wj · xijt · (t/pij + 1/2). Hence, the linear program Primal is a valid relaxation of our problem.
Now, suppose that we constrain each machine to run at a reduced speed of 1/2α. In other words, each machine can process at most 1/2α units of the jobs during one unit of time. It is easy to see that the modified LP described below is a valid relaxation under this new constraint. This transformation increases the objective by at most a factor of 2α.
Lemma 5. The optimal objective of the linear program Primal(α) is at most 2α times the total disutility of the jobs in any feasible integral schedule.
Finally, we write down the dual of the above linear program.
Analysis..
Fix a profile of scheduling policies A = (A1, . . . , A |M| ), where Ai gives the scheduling policy declared by the machine i. For all i ∈ M, the scheduling policy Ai is myopic, monotone and has a stretch α. Recall the notations introduced in Section 2. For the rest of this section, we focus on any scenario S = (A, Q, θ) where the strategy-profile θ is a pure Nash equilibrium of Game(A).
We will set the variables of the linear program Dual(α) so as to get a feasible dual solution, with an objective that is at least 1/2 times the total disutility of the jobs under the scenario S. This, combined with Lemma 5 and weak duality, will imply that the price of anarchy of Game(A) is at most 4α.
Setting the dual variables:.
The variable yj is set to be the disutility of the job j under the scenario S. Further, the variable zit is set to be half of the total weight of the unfinished jobs on machine i at time t, under the scenario S.
Lemma 6. If the dual variables are set as in the equations 14, 15, then the objective of the linear program Dual(α)
Proof. We use the well-known fact that the total weighted completion time of all the jobs assigned to any specific machine i is equal to t Wi(t). Thus, we infer that:
The lemma follows from the above inequality and the fact that j yj = j COST A j (θ). Theorem 8 will follow from Lemma 5, Lemma 6, and Lemma 7. We present the proof of Lemma 7 to complete the analysis. Clearly, the dual variables are set to nonnegative values. For the rest of the proof, we fix a job j, a machine i, and a time t ≥ rij, and show that the corresponding dual constraint is satisfied.
A Thought Experiment..
We create a job j with p ij = pij, w j = wj, and r ij = t. The machine i is now asked to process the set of jobs Qi ∪{j } using the scheduling policy Ai. Under this thought experiment, let C * j denote the completion time of the job j . Recall that Ai is a myopic scheduling policy (Definition 2). Hence, under this thought experiment, the total weight of the unfinished jobs on machine i at time t is exactly Wi(t) + w j . Since the policy Ai also has stretch α, Lemma 4 gives:
Plugging in the equalities Wi(t) = 2zit, w j = wj, and p ij = pij, we get:
We now consider two possible cases.
Case 1:.
Job j selects machine i under the outcome S, so that θj = i.
Let C * j denote the completion time of the job j under the thought experiment. Recall that the machine follows a monotone scheduling policy. Hence, part 3 of Definition 3 implies that C *
Equation 16 and Equation 17 imply that the dual constraint is satisfied.
Case 2:.
Job j does not select machine i under the scenario S, so that θj = i.
Consider the scenario S. We want to bound the completion time of the job j when it switches to the machine i, and everything else remains the same. This is denoted by C A j (i, θ−j). This also corresponds to a thought experiment, where the machine i is asked to schedule the jobs in Qi ∪ {j} using the scheduling policy Ai. The only difference between this thought experiment and the previous one is that here the job being inserted has an earlier release date (rij ≤ r ij = t, wj = w j , pij = p ij ). Accordingly, part 1 of Definition 3 implies that C
Finally, recall that the strategy-profile θ is a pure Nash equilibrium of Game(A). Hence, we have: 
Extension to Mixed and Correlated PoA
In this section, we give the complete proof of PoA bound for mixed Nash equilibrium using dual fitting. Reader can verify that, the same proof extends to Correlated Equilibrium. As a first step, we derive a (slightly) different bound on the completion time of a job when a scheduling policy satisfies the α-stretch (Def 1),is myopic (Def 2) and monotone (Def 3). Recall that for a scheduling policy A and an input set Q of jobs, Cj denotes the completion time of job j ∈ Q; Q(t) denotes the set of unsatisfied jobs at time rj and W (t) denotes the total weight of unsatisfied jobs at time t.
Lemma 8. If a scheduling policy A which is myopic,monotone and has a stretch α, then the following inequalities hold for all input sets of jobs Q.
Proof. Recall the definition of an α-stretch policy. We know from Definition 1,
Consider the game induced by a profile of scheduling policies A = (A1, . . . , A |M| ), where Ai is the scheduling policy followed by the machine i. Furthermore, for all i ∈ M, the scheduling policy Ai is myopic, monotone and has a stretch α. Fix any (mixed) Nash equilibrium of this game and let the corresponding strategy-profile of jobs be denoted by θ = (θ1, . . . , θ |J | ), where θj = (σ1, . . . σi, . . . σ |M | ) and σi is the probability with which machine i selected by the job j. Let (A, θ) be denoted by scenario S.
We will use E[Cost Setting the dual variables.
The variable yj is set to be the total penalty incurred by the job j, under the scenario S. On the other hand, the variable zit is set to be half of the expected total weight of the unfinished jobs on machine i at time t.
Lemma 9. If the dual variables are set as in the equations 20, 21, then the objective of the linear program Dual(α)
Proof. We invoke a standard characterization of completion time, which says that the total weighted completion time of all the jobs assigned to any specific machine i is equal to t W S i (t). Thus, we infer that:
The lemma follows from the above inequality and the fact
Lemma 10. If the dual variables are set as in the equations 20, 21, then all the constraints of the linear program Dual(α) are feasible.
Proof. Clearly, the dual variables are set to nonnegative values. To complete the proof, we need to show that the dual constraint corresponding to any job j, any machine i, and any time t ≥ rij, is satisfied. Let E[Cost S j (i, θ−j)] denote the expected cost incurred by job j if it unilaterally deviates to machine i, everything else remaining the same. Similarly, let E[C S j (i, θ−j)] denotes the expected completion time of job j if it deviates to machine i. Since, S = (A, θ) is in Nash equilibrium, we have
To show that all the dual constraints are satisfied, fix a job j, machine i and some time instant t ≥ rij.
Consider the following thought experiment. We create a job j * with pij * = pij, wj * = wj, and rij * = t. Machine i is asked to process this job j * . In otherwords, we take the scenario S = (A, θ) which is in Nash equilibrium and modify it into a new scenario S = (A, θ ) as follows. θ = θ ∪ θj * and θj * = (0, . . . , σi = 1, . . . 0). Let E[Cj * ] denote the expected completion time of the job j * . Since Ai is a myopic scheduling policy (Definition 2), under this thought experiment the expected total weight of the unfinished jobs on machine i at time t is exactly E[W S i (t)] + wj * . Since the policy Ai also has stretch α, simple extension of Lemma 8 gives:
Plugging in the equalities E[W S i (t)] = 2zit, wj * = wj, and pij * = pij, we get:
To complete the proof, we note that since Ai is a myopic and monotone scheduling policy,
Therefore from Equations 22, 23 and 24 we have,
Therefore, dual constraints are feasible. This completes the proof.
From Theorem 5 and Lemma 9, it follows that PoA of α-stretch scheduling policies which are monotone and myopic is at most 4α.
NON-PREEMPTIVE SCHEDULING POLI-CIES
We show how to transform any preemptive policy into a non-preemptive policy in which the completion time of a job increases at most by a factor 2. This ensures that if the preemptive policy had a stretch α to begin with, then the resulting non-preemptive policy has a stretch 2α. This implies Theorem 6. Our transformation is similar in spirit to the one used in [13] .
Consider any α-stretch scheduling policy Ai declared by machine i. Recall that Qi denotes the set of jobs assigned to machine i. Let Cj be completion time of job j in the schedule produced by policy Ai on the set Qi. Renumber the jobs in Qi such that Cj−1 < Cj. We modify the preemptive schedule produced by Ai into a non-preemptive schedule in the following manner.
• Consider the jobs in j ∈ Qi in increasing order of their completion time values Cj. Schedule the jobs nonpreemptively in this order.
Let Cj denote the completion time of job j in this new schedule. The following theorem shows that, the completion time every job in the new schedule increases at most by a factor of 2.
Proof. Fix a job j. The completion time of the job j in the non-preemptive schedule can be bounded by:
Recall that we renumbered the jobs in the set Qi in the increasing order of Cj values. The above inequality holds since there is no idle period after the job with highest release date in the set [1 . . . j] is released.
The proof of the theorem follows from the observations that Cj ≥ max k∈[j] r ik and Cj ≥ k∈[j] p ik .
K -NORMS OF COMPLETION TIME
In this section, we extend our result for total completion time to the objective of k -norms of complete time. The k -norms of complete time of all jobs is defined as ( j (Cj − r θ j ,j ) k ) 1/k when job j is assigned to machine θj and is completed at time Cj. The kth power of completion time is defined as j (Cj − r θ j ,j ) k . For the sake of analysis, we will first bound the smoothness of the game for the kth power of completion time, and will take the kth root at the end of analysis. The notation will remain the same unless specifically stated. We will use COST to refer to kth power of completion time. For example, COST S denotes the total kth power of completion time of all jobs under the schedule (scenario) S. We let COST S,S j denote the kth power of completion time of job j when the job j is scheduled on machine θ j with jobs Q θ j by the scheduling policy A θ j . More intuitively, COST S,S j is job j's kth power of completion time when it moves to the machine on which S scheduled the job. This section is devoted to proving the following theorem. In this paper, we only give a high-level overview of the analysis. The details will appear in the full version of this paper.
Theorem 10. For any integer k ≥ 2, consider the objective of minimizing kth power of completion time. Also consider any two scenarios S = (A, Q, θ) and S = (A , Q , θ ) where all scheduling policies Ai (specified by A) have stretch α. Then it follows that Hence we derive an upper bound of O(α k 2 +k · (36k) k−1 ) on the robust PoA of the game for kth power of completion time. By taking the kth root on this bound, we obtain an upper bound of O(α k+1 k) for the k -norms of completion time, thereby proving Theorem 4 and 5. We note that this can be done since each job behaves in the same way for both objectives. For mixed and correlated Nash equilibria, this is not the case, and it should be assumed that each job's goal is to minimize its expected kth power of completion time, not its expected completion time. We also note that there is almost a tight lower bound of Ω(k/ log k) on the price of anarchy [9] .
Overview of the Analysis
In this section we give an overview of the analysis. We define the following potential function. Consider any two scenarios S = (A, Q, θ) and S = (A , Q , θ ).Suppose that in S, every machine is running at a reduced speed of δ ∈ [0, 1]. This situation shall be denoted by S(δ). More precisely, a job j is processed in S at time t if and only if the same job j is processed in S(δ) at time t/δ; both Q and θ are the same in S and S(δ).
For all machines i ∈ M, time t, and j ∈ Q S(δ) , define : 
The second inequality follows from a simple inequality that ∀x, y ≥ 0, (x + y)
The last inequality follows from the fact that (rij + pij) is a lower bound on the completion time of job j in any schedule where job j is assigned to machine i (which is the case in the assignment Q).
Hence our analysis will be focused on bounding Φ S(δ),S (0).
We will study Note that COST S (0) = COST S and COST S (∞) = 0. To this end, we show that for any δ ∈ (0, 1], and ∈ (0, 1), we will show that at all times t, As mentioned, our remaining task is to upper bound d dt Φ S(δ),S (t). We will first introduce several useful technical lemmas. Then we will proceed our analysis by considering the effect of the processing in S(δ) and S , separately. Throughout the analysis all ties are broken in an arbitrary but a consistent way. Particularly, the reader may read the analysis assuming that no two different jobs have the same size, nor the same remaining size.
